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Outage and incident data over the last 30 days for Atlassian Support.
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Sign Up NowOutlogger tracks the status of these components for Xero:
Component | Status |
---|---|
API Docs | Active |
Blogs | Active |
Careers | Active |
Community | Active |
Content Delivery | Active |
Downloads Access | Active |
Knowledge Base | Active |
Preferences Center | Active |
Public Issues Tracker | Active |
Search | Active |
Support Portal | Active |
Ticketing | Active |
Training | Active |
View the latest incidents for Atlassian Support and check for official updates:
Description: Between 19:15 UTC to 20:00 UTC, we experienced an outage for authentication policies, get API tokens, claiming domains, and managed accounts functionality for Atlassian Support and Atlassian Access. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating normally.
Status: Resolved
Impact: Major | Started At: May 5, 2021, 7:49 p.m.
Description: Training porta is working as normal.
Status: Resolved
Impact: Major | Started At: April 20, 2021, 6:04 p.m.
Description: ### **SUMMARY** On March 19, 2021, a security researcher participating in our [bug bounty program](https://bugcrowd.com/atlassian) notified Atlassian of a vulnerability in our Edge Networking Infrastructure that allowed specially-crafted HTTP requests to interfere with and disrupt the expected handling of network traffic using a technique known as HTTP request smuggling. This vulnerability affected the following Atlassian cloud products: Jira Work Management, Jira Service Management, Jira Software, Confluence, Bitbucket and Statuspage. We were able to patch the vulnerability on April 16, 2021. Out of an abundance of caution, we began the additional step of invalidating all established user sessions across all Atlassian products between April 16 and April 28, 2021. ### **IMPACT** The HTTP request smuggling vulnerability was not exploited and no credentials were compromised throughout this security incident. In the process of validating our patch for the vulnerability, requests related to four user sessions were mishandled by our networking infrastructure, causing some users to be presented with a page showing the site name \([sitename.atlassian.net](http://sitename.atlassian.net)\) and email address of another user. No other data or information was disclosed to or accessed by unauthorized users during the course of the testing and validation. We have since invalidated all sessions on the affected products. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The root cause was HTTP request smuggling which allowed specially-crafted HTTP requests to interfere with, and disrupt the expected handling of traffic through the load balancers used by Atlassian’s Network Edge. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS** Atlassian has a [comprehensive set of security practices](https://www.atlassian.com/trust/security/security-practices) in place to ensure we protect customer information and offer reliable and secure services. However, we also recognize that security incidents may still happen, and it is just as important to have effective methods for handling them. In this case we utilized our security incident response mechanism to: * develop a patch for the smuggling vulnerability * deploy the patch to all production load balancing infrastructure * invalidate all established user sessions. We apologise to our customers that were impacted throughout the duration of this security incident and thank you for your understanding. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support
Status: Postmortem
Impact: None | Started At: April 19, 2021, 4:32 a.m.
Description: Logged in users' ability to view content and create new content has been restored as of 2021-01-19 17:35 UTC.
Status: Resolved
Impact: Minor | Started At: Feb. 19, 2021, 2:32 p.m.
Description: A backup of our system from 2020-12-14 was erroneously restored by our service provider during routine maintenance on 2021-01-03. After identifying the cause of the issue we restored the backup taken before routine maintenance and have restored normal services. Atlassian will be conducting a thorough review with our vendor to ensure that restoration processes are automated in a fashion that will not cause this type of incident to reoccur.
Status: Postmortem
Impact: Critical | Started At: Jan. 4, 2021, 6:44 p.m.
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